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Abstract
The paper introduces an agent-based simulation model to study the
technological development and the economic performance of firms with
potential knowledge spillover in a differentiated industry. The analysis is
based on the interaction and behavior of firms, which might share knowl-
edge but at the same time are competitors on the goods markets. The
aim of the model is to get a better understanding of the interplay between
technological and geographical location decisions and the evolution of spe-
cific knowledge in an industry. For this the advantages and disadvantages
of two forms of distances are discussed: geographical and cognitive respec-
tively technological distance. First simulation runs indicate that the model
is able to describe the technological development and produces plausible
industry characteristics. It is shown that geographical proximity enhances
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1 Introduction
Innovation and technological change seem to be crucial for understanding eco-
nomic growth. This paper introduces an agent-based model in order to study
the interplay between technological and geographical location decisions and the
evolution of specific knowledge in an industry.
Geographical and technological proximity are seen as main factors fostering
innovation1, because both kinds of proximity have an impact on the learning
capabilities of firms. Beside investments in Research and Development (R&D)
learning allows firms to accumulate knowledge which is the precondition for gen-
erating successful innovations: either to raise productivity through process inno-
vation or to attract new consumer groups with new products through product
innovations. Knowledge is inherently different from the more traditional inputs
of labor, capital, and land: knowledge is intrinsically uncertain, it is asymmetric
allocated between economic agents, it is cumulative and can be transmitted vol-
untary or involuntary (at least over some geographical distance) without loosing
any value (see Dosi, 1988b). In order to catch all relevant effects of innovation
the model has to take into account this particular characteristics of knowledge.
The empirical literature suggests that geographical proximity leads to a faster
diffusion of knowledge through spatially bounded knowledge spillover. A recent
survey by Asheim and Gertler (2005) even claims: ”..one simply cannot un-
derstand innovation properly if one does not appreciate the central role of spatial
proximity and concentration in this process.” Based on these observations a core-
periphery pattern is used, so that firms can either choose a location in the core
or in the periphery. The core may also be understood as a cluster or network,
where all firms might profit from the knowledge of each other. The concentration
of firms in the core leads to higher production cost resulting from shortage of
scarce resources. On the other hand firms can choose a location in the periph-
ery with lower production cost, but then they cannot increase their knowledge
with external spillover. If a firm chooses isolation, it will however not loose their
technological core competence via involuntary knowledge spillover.
The cognitive or technological distance seems to be significant for the learn-
1For a recent overview see Boschma (2005)
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ing process, too. The amount of knowledge a firm is able to use economically
is described by the absorptive capacity (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990).
The concept of absorptive capacity sets a lower bar for the firm’s knowledge
heterogeneity. But the learning effect is also reduced if a firm wants to absorb
very similar knowledge. The heterogeneity of knowledge should be ”sufficiently
small to allow for understanding but sufficiently large to yield non-redundant,
novel knowledge” (Nooteboom, 2000, p. 72). The results of the knowledge ex-
change process could be described as an inverse U-shaped relation depending on
technological distance. The heterogeneity of knowledge can be expressed by the
technological distance, measured by the path between two technologies in a tech-
nology space and the technological gap between the knowledge stock of two firms
in these technologies. Both elements are relevant for the resulting learning effect
through knowledge spillover.
In the past, industry simulation models which considered knowledge spillover
with geographical and/or technological distance were often based on a cellular
automata framework, e.g. Verspagen (1993); Keilbach (2000); Brenner (2001);
Canie¨ls and Verspagen (2001) and Meagher and Rogers (2004) present simulation
models with innovation in a spatial landscape. Other approaches like Cantner
and Pyka (1998a,b) describe industry dynamic models with heterogeneous knowl-
edge spillover. Here a product market was modelled while focussing either on the
absorptive capacity of firms or the selection process with different technologies.
Jonard and Yildizoglu (1998) and Zhang (2003) introduce extensions of the tra-
ditional Nelson and Winter (1982) model with a technological space and spatially
bounded knowledge externalities. Gilbert et al. (2001) describe the interaction
of agents with a specified knowledge base in an innovation network. This paper
combines elements of these simulation studies while concentrating on the interac-
tion on differentiated product markets and strategic location of firms in the sense
of geographical and technological distance.
The methodology of agent-based simulation is particularly useful in connec-
tion with modelling innovation and knowledge spillover, because it enables to
describe the intrinsic uncertainty, the cumulative structure and the dynamics
involved in innovation processes (see Dosi, 1988a), the endogenously changing
market structure (see Klepper, 1996) and the heterogeneity of knowledge, which
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is essential for learning (see Nooteboom, 2000).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section 2 the model is intro-
duced. The description of the model contains the role of knowledge, the circular
technology space, the calculation of knowledge spillover, the market demand and
cost structures, as well as the decision making of firms and finally the market
clearing. Section 3 shows the setup for the simulation studies. First results of
the simulation runs can be found in section 4. The paper closes with the main
conclusions.
2 The Model
In order to deal with the effects of geographical and technological distance an
industry-simulation model is introduced. The model is based on Dawid and
Reimann (2003, 2004) with the extension of heterogeneous knowledge spillover.
The production side of the industry is represented by an agent-based model al-
lowing for heterogeneities of location, cost-structures, strategies concerning pro-
duction and R&D among the industry firms. The demand side is highly stylized
employing the concept of a representative consumer.
2.1 Knowledge and Innovations
The knowledge of firms is one of the most important elements of the model. Each
firm holds a technological profile, which represents the capabilities for innovations.
On the one hand the company may introduce a new method, which leads to lower
production cost, or it presents a better version of an existing product. On the
other hand the firm wants to launch a brand-new product in order to meet the
needs of new consumer groups. The first part of the technology profile is captured
by a knowledge stock for process innovations RDproci,j,t and the second part by a
knowledge stock for product innovations RDprodi,j,t , both depending on the company
i, the technology j and the time period t.
Both stock variables can be increased either by own investments in R&D
(Iproci,j,t or I
prod
i,j,t ) or by knowledge spillover (SP
proc
i,j,t or SP
prod
i,j,t ), where investments
in R&D and spillover are understood as perfect substitutes. The build-up of a
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knowledge stock for innovations has the property that it is a time consuming
process where experiments and knowledge is step by step accumulated over time.
It is also assumed, that the return to investment, measured by increases in the
knowledge stock, decreases as the company approaches the frontier of RDmaxj .
The knowledge starts at zero or at an initialized number in the interval [0,1].
Afterwards the knowledge stock is updated as follows:
RDproci,j,t = RD
max
j −
(
RDmaxj −RDproci,j,t−1
) 1 + αiβi(Iproci,j,t−1 + SP proci,j,t )
1 + αi(I
proc
i,j,t−1 + SP
proc
i,j,t )
(1)
Here αi > 0 and βi > 0 are firm-specific parameters, which describe the ability
of the firm to develop new products and the efficiency of the use of R&D funds.
In particular, firm i can each period reduce the gap to the frontier RDmaxj at
most by the factor βi. Equation (1) also represents the cumulative property of
knowledge. A rising knowledge stock for process innovations RDproci,j,t leads directly
to lower production cost.
The formula for updating the knowledge stock for product innovations is sim-
ilar with the only difference, that the upper bound is equal to 1:
RDprodi,j,t = 1−
(
1−RDprodi,j,t−1
) 1 + αiβi(Iprodi,j,t−1 + SP prodi,j,t )
1 + αi(I
prod
i,j,t−1 + SP
prod
i,j,t )
(2)
In contrast to process innovation a knowledge stock for product innovation
greater zero does not automatically lead towards a successful product innovation.
In fact the immanent uncertainty with product innovations is captured by a
stochastic process which determines, if a product innovation is successful or not.
A product innovation can be either incremental or radical.2 In case of a radical
innovation a new technology was created which is a little more separated from
the others. In order to show this we have to introduce the technology space first.
2Two numbers were chosen: u from the uniformly distributed interval [c, d] with 0 < c < d,
and v from the uniformly distributed interval [d, e] with d < e ≤ 1. If RDprodi,j,t > u the firm i
was able to introduce a product innovation on the market. If RDprodi,j,t > v the new product was
a technological breakthrough, which could be interpreted as a radical innovation. Otherwise
the product innovation is incremental.
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2.2 The Technology Space
The technology space is interpreted as a circle in tradition of the circular city
models in the industrial organization literature (originally introduced by Salop,
1979). The idea is that products belonging to a technology j, which marks
a certain point on that circle, are horizontally differentiated. The technological
distance dtechj,j+1,t between two technologies j and j+1 is interpreted as the shortest
way on the circle. The overall number of existing technologies should be mt. In
figure 1 the technological space and the corresponding technological distances are
shown.
Figure 1: The technology space as a circle.
A successful product innovation adds a new technology on the circular tech-
nology space. In the case of incremental innovation the new technology mt+1 is
placed right in the middle between two existing ones. The firm wants to get close
to a promising technology j but while all products are substitutes, it chooses j
as a neighbor but as far as possible. The firm will choose a technological location
next to j where the technological distance to the next technology is greatest. If
the technological distances to the neighbors are equal, the firm will choose a loca-
tion with a higher starting value for the knowledge stock for process innovation.3
3Thus the new technology will have the technological distance of dtechj,mt+1,t = d
tech
mt+1,j+1,t
=
dtechj,j+1,t−1
2 to their neighbors.
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In figure 2 an incremental innovation is illustrated.
Figure 2: Incremental product innovation.
In the case of a radical innovation the circle expands as the new product adds
significant new features to the product of the industry as shown in figure 3. As
with every product innovation the firm will always choose a location where the
distance to their neighbors is greatest (if equal with the higher starting value
for the knowledge stock for process innovations) but in the neighborhood of a
specified technology j.4 For τ periods both connections exist, but afterwards the
connection between j and j + 1 is only possible over the new technology mt + 1.
The old connection dtechj,j+1,t is cleared.
The innovating firm with a new kind of product stays for τ periods as a
monopolist on this new market. After that period other firms can gain specific
knowledge in this technology and produce this product variant, too. The initial
R&D stock for this new product variant is depending on the knowledge of the
innovating firm in the neighboring technologies. This fact considers the cumula-
tive structure of knowledge, so that the firm can make use of similar knowledge
already accumulated in the firm. Thus the initial knowledge stock for the new
4In case of a radical innovation the distances to the neighbors stay the same dtechj,mt+1,t =
dtechmt+1,j+1,t = d
tech
j,j+1,t−τ .
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Figure 3: Radical product innovation. (After τ periods the connection dtechj,j+1,t is
cleared.)
technology RDproci,mt+1,t is the mean of the neighboring technologies of the innovat-
ing firm i, but at least a lower bound RD0 and at most 1.
The maximal value RDmaxj which can be reached in this market should be
twice this initial knowledge stock for the new technology. This means that the
knowledge in every market can only be doubled. If the frontier was reached, firms
may try to launch product innovations technological close to this market in order
to become experts in that part of the technological space.
An example for the technology space comes from the automobile industry:
starting with three main technologies freight vehicles, passenger cars and busses,
the introduction of vans and SUVs (sport-utility vehicles) could be interpreted as
product innovations. In figure 4 the example is represented. Vans are indicated
as an incremental innovation which combines features of the neighboring indus-
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tries for busses and passenger cars. SUVs could stand for a mixture between
passenger cars and freight vehicles. The presentation of SUV with help of mar-
keting instruments was a huge economic profit for the automobile industry. For
this, SUVs should be considered (at least in economic perspective) as a radical
product innovation. The widening of the technology space leads in total to higher
profits for the firms as new consumer groups became interested in products of
this industry. A more detailed technological space could be imagined by sorting
brands or design models of the automotive industry on the circle.
Figure 4: The technology space and an example from the automobile industry.
2.3 Learning through Knowledge Spillover
Heterogeneity of knowledge is a precondition for learning. The differences in
knowledge are interpreted in two ways: First, there are technological distances
between different strands of technologies. Second, there is a difference in two
knowledge stocks which represents the knowledge gap. The knowledge gap tik,jl,t
between firm i an k related to different technologies j and l in period t is:
tik,jl,t = max
{
ln
(
RDprock,l,t
RDproci,j,t
)
, 0
}
In this formula the technological gap is only greater than zero, if the other
company k has a greater value of the knowledge stock variable. The function is
concave.
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As mentioned above the absorptive capacity of a firm is crucial for learning
through knowledge externalities. The concept of absorptive capacity is incorpo-
rated in the variable γi,t of firm i in t, which is assumed to be the mean value
over all mt technologies. Therefore a firm with a high amount of technological
knowledge is able to absorb a higher fraction of external and internal knowledge:
γi,t =
∑mt
j RD
proc
i,j,t
mt
Up to now we presented the technological aspects of proximity and learning.
The geographical aspect of learning is captured by the geographical distance dgeoi,t
of firm i. The geographical distance is modelled similar to core periphery models
(see e.g. Krugman, 1991). There are only two possible locations for firms: in the
core (or cluster) or outside in the periphery.
dgeoi,t =
{
0, in the core;
1, in the periphery.
A location in the core leads to a better exchange of tacit knowledge but it
might also raise the own production cost because of scarce resources through
higher office rents or price for building land, higher wages for employees etc. If a
company is a technological leader it might also prefer a location in the periphery
in order not to let too much knowledge spill over upon competitors.
Now we do have all ingredients for the calculation of knowledge spillover which
represent learning in the model. Firms i and k can learn from competitors only
if both of them are placed in the core, that is (1 − dgeoi,t ) · (1 − dgeok,t ) = 1. But
learning can also happen within the firm, where knowledge is transmitted from
one kind to another. Learning regards all technologies mt. Based on the formula
for knowledge spillover from Verspagen (1993) and Cantner and Pyka (1998a,b)
with two kinds of distances dgeoi,t and d
tech
j,l,t , the technological gap tik,jlt and the
absorptive capacity γi,t the resulting knowledge spillover for process innovations
SP proci,j,t for the technology j and firm i can be written as:
SP proci,j,t =
mt∑
l=1
∑
k 6=i
[
(1− dgeoi,t )(1− dgeok,t ) ·
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
· tik,jl,t · e−
tik,jl,t
γi,t
]
+
mt∑
l=1
[
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
· tii,jl,t · e−
tii,jl,t
γi,t
] (3)
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Analogously the knowledge spillover for product innovations SP prodi,j,t are for-
mulated.
The first term stands for the external knowledge spillover. They are only
greater than zero if both firms are in the core. The second term stands for internal
knowledge spillover which exist independent of the geographical location of the
firm. The formula is build in that way, that it is maximized if the technological
gap equals the absorptive capacity. Any deviations from this point lead to lower
knowledge transfer. This represents that learning has less effect if the knowledge
is too similar or too different. A higher technological distance dtechj,l,t between the
two regarding technologies j and l reduces the possible learning effect, too.
Learning in this model is therefore described in that way that the technological
profiles of two firms are compared and the specific gains are calculated. Even
with no own investments in R&D firms could increase their specific knowledge
by learning.
2.4 Market Demand
We consider an industry consisting of n producers. At any point in time t there
exist mt sub-markets within this industry, where each sub-market represents a
variant of the product considered. With every technology located on the circu-
lar technological space the production of a certain variant is possible. Thus the
index j stands for each sub-market as well for the corresponding technology. Con-
sumers are assumed to have love-for-variety preferences where the representative
consumer has a utility function:
ut (X1t..Xmtt) =
[
mt∑
j=1
(Aj,t ·Xj,t)b
]1/b
(4)
The parameters Aj,t denote the current attractiveness of product variant j and
Xj,t consumption of product variant j. The degree of complementarity between
the different product variants is expressed by b ∈ [0, 1] where values close to zero
correspond to complementary goods whereas the variants are perfect substitutes
for b = 1.
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The standard love-for-variety approach assumes equal attractiveness of the
variants but in this case the variants should be weighted by the level of attrac-
tiveness. The attractiveness Aj,t of product variant j depends on the technological
distances to the neighbors of j in the technology space. The greater the product
of the distances the greater is the market niche and therefore the attractiveness
for the consumers:
Aj,t = d
tech
j−1,j,t · dtechj,j+1,t (5)
The utility function in equation (4) is maximized subject to the budget con-
straint:
mt∑
j=1
pj,t ·Xj,t ≤ B(t) (6)
B(t) denotes the overall amount of money allocated by consumers to purchase
goods produced in this industry. We will assume that it increases with the number
of attractiveness of product variants, however at a decreasing rate:
B(t) = msize
mt
A+mt
(7)
Here msize gives the maximal amount of money that could be allocated to
purchase in this industry and A governs how fast the allocated funds grow with
increasing overall attractiveness of the sub-markets. By making this assumption
we intend to capture the goods produced in this industry do not only compete
among themselves but also compete for consumer budget allocation with out-
side products. All producers in this industry set production quantities for all
sub-markets they are in and prices are determined by market clearing. Straight-
forward calculations yield the following inverse demand curve for a market j:
pj,t =
B(t) · Abj,t
X1−bj,t ·
∑mt
l=1 (Al,t ·Xl,t)b
(8)
In contrast to Dawid and Reimann (2003, 2004) in this model no explicit in-
dustry life cycle via the attractiveness of the product variants is incorporated. In
this model there will be a reduction in demand on one sub-market with increasing
number of product innovations. But the demand of one sub-market will however
never fall down to zero.
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2.5 The Cost Structures of Producers
Each of the n firms in the industry can in every period produce for each of the
public sub-markets. We denote by Mi,t the set of markets the firm i produces for
in period t and by xi,j,t the output quantity of firm i on sub-market j. The firms
production cost are given by:
Ci,t(xi,t) = Fi · |Mi,t|+
∑
j∈Mi,t
(ci,j,t · x2i,j,t) (9)
The fixed cost Fi are a constant firm specific parameter. For every sub-market
the firm produces for fix cost Fi arise. The variable costs ci,j,t depend on two
factors: first the amount of knowledge in technology j and geographical location
of the firm, because we assume that all production takes place at the location
of the firm. The first term ci,j,t is in consequence depending on the current
knowledge and the second term depends on the geographical location:
ci,j,t = ci,j,t + c
geo
t (10)
An important aspect of this model is the fact that production cost can be
decreased over time through process improvements and accumulation of tacit
knowledge. The variable ci,j,t is a result of such process improvements. At the
time where firm i starts producing variant j we have ci,j,t = c
ini
i,j but afterwards i
can invest in every period t where j ∈Mi,t in cost reducing process improvements
in the production of j. We assume that there is a maximal fraction (1− cmini,j ) by
which this cost parameter can be reduced through the knowledge stock for process
innovations RDproci,j,t . As written above the knowledge stock can be increased by
investments in R&D or by knowledge spillover.
ci,j,t = c
ini
i,j
[
cmini,j + (1− cmini,j )(1−RDproci,j,t )
]
(11)
The scarce resource in the core leads to an increase in the marginal production
cost of every firm in the core. If only one firm is in the core no additional cost
will occur. The marginal cost for every single output quantity of a firm in the
core (dgeoi,t = 0) is increased by c
geo
t . How much the production cost raise depends
on the total number of firms in the core and on the parameters R and cgeo.
cgeot = (1− dgeoi,t ) · (|Nt| − 1)c
geo ·R (12)
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The number of firms in the core should be called |Nt|, where Nt is the set of
firms which are located in period t inside the core. The parameter cgeo describes
the gradient of the geographical cost function, for example cgeo < 1 would lead
to a concave and cgeo > 1 to a convex geographical cost function.
In result two counter effects arise inside the core. On the one hand a firm
can profit from learning through knowledge spillover, which reduce via process
innovations the term ci,j,t. But on the other hand the firm has higher marginal
cost because of the scarce resource.
2.6 Decision Making
The decision process of the firms involves three steps: first, to decide on the set
of markets the firm intends to service, second to determine the output quanti-
ties for these markets, and third to decide on investments in product or process
innovations and geographical location.
The firms behavior is based on decision rules in the tradition of evolutionary
modelling (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Firms have different forms of evaluating
technologies, sub markets and location. Depending on this evaluation they will
enter and exit sub markets, invest in product and process innovations or change
their location from core to periphery or vice versa.
2.6.1 Market Entry and Exit
The total number of firms in the industry n is assumed to stay constant. But the
number of firms who are active on a certain sub-market is determined endogenous.
The change in the market portfolio a firm holds is modelled as a sequence of
rule-based market exit and entry decisions. The exit and entry rules rely on an
evaluation of all existing markets carried out at the beginning of each period. It
is assumed that at the end of period all firms can observe the average profits on
every market and have an idea of the public technology space.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible the evaluation for market entry
depends only on the average profits on a sub-market and on the technological
distance to the own main technological focus. The factors in the evaluation
function should be in the interval [0, 1]. For this the average profit Π¯i,j,t−1 on the
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market j is divided by the greatest profit a firm made on any sub-market in the
last period.
The own technological focus l is the technology with the greatest knowledge
stock: l from maxj {RDproci,j,t }. For this the evaluation vi,j,t of a sub-market j is
given by:
vi,j,t =
(
Π¯i,j,t−1
maxk,l{Πk,l,t−1}
) δi,Π
δi,Π+δi,T ·
(
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
) δi,T
δiT+δi,Π
(13)
The sum of the exponents is chosen to be equal to 1. The exponents are
important parameters of the firm’s diversification strategy since they represent
the weights assigned to profits and technological specialization.
To make the entry decision the firm ranks all available markets5 it does not
currently serve according to their evaluations and determines the best existing
non-served market as the entry candidate. The entry candidate is added to the
portfolio if vi,l,t > κi,en. The parameter κi,en > 0 is an inertia parameter and
represents the aggressiveness of the firm’s entry policy. The firm can only enter
in one sub-market every period.
The exit decision of the firm is determined solely on the sum of profits of the
last τex periods. The firm will chose the market with lowest value for
∑τex
τ=1Πi,j,t−τ
and will exit this sub-market if the sum of the profits is negative:
∑τex
τ=1Πi,j,t−τ <
0. The knowledge of this specific technology remains in the firm. The firm exits
up to one sub-market a period.
2.6.2 Quantity Decisions
In order to describe the rules which govern the quantity decision making of the
firm we should first be more explicit about the amount of information firms can
use. We assume that the aggregate output quantities and the number of firms in
all sub-markets at t−1 can be observed by all producers including those that were
not active in this market. Furthermore, the price elasticities of demand ²j,t for
these quantities are also common knowledge. Each firm has in all periods perfect
information about the own fixed cost Fi and marginal cost ci,j,t of production of
5After a successful product innovation the innovating firm is monopolist on this market for
τ periods and therefore no other firms can enter.
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all product variants. Firms however do not have perfect information about the
exact shape of entire demand function and also do not know other firm’s cost
structures.
Given the set of sub-markets Mi,t firm i tries to maximize their profits by
choosing the optimal output quantity xi,j,t in each sub-market:
max
xi,j,t,j∈Mi,t
[
pj,t · xi,j,t − ci,j,t · x2i,j,t
]
(14)
subject to the constraint that current production has to be paid for by the
current stock of savings:
Si,t ≥ Fi · |Mi,t|+
∑
j∈Mi,t
(ci,j,t · x2i,j,t). (15)
The corresponding fist order conditions with the lagrange multiplier µi,t ≥ 0
of the firm’s budget constraint and MRi,j,t the marginal revenue are:
pj,t + xi,j,t · δpj,t
δxi,j,t
− 2 · ci,j,t · xi,j,t − µi,t · 2ci,j,t · xi,j,t =
MRi,j,t − 2(1 + µi,t)ci,j,t · xi,j,t = 0 ∀j ∈Mi,t (16)
Due to the limited information about the demand function and the competi-
tor’s production cost, firms cannot simply determine the Nash equilibrium of this
quantity setting game. Rather they use some heuristic approximations to deter-
mine their output quantity. For setting the quantity output several steps have to
be taken.
First, the firms believe that all producers in the sub market j change their
output quantity by the same factor λj. For this the total estimated output Xˆj,t
on sub market j is given by: Xˆj,t = λj · Xj,t−1. Second, the firms assume that
the price elasticities are constant: ˆ²j,t = ²j,t−1. Third, the firms expect that all
firms change their output in the same way they would do: λˆj = λi,j,t. Thus they
expect the following prices:
pˆj,t = pj,t−1
(
1 +
λj − 1
²j,t−1
)
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At last, the firms approximate their marginal revenue by the following expres-
sion typically used in standard markup pricing formulas:
ˆMRi,j,t = pˆj,t
(
1 +
xi,j,t
Xˆj,t · ²j,t−1
)
With these information the firms can calculate their optimal production quan-
tity in each sub-market. For firms that have been in sub-market j in period t− 1
inserting these expression into (16) gives the output quantity xi,j,t = λi,j,t ·xi,j,t−1,
where:
λi,j,t =
pj,t−1(²j,t−1 − 1)(Xj,t−1²j,t−1 + xi,j,t−1)
2ci,j,t(1 + µi,t)xi,j,t−1Xj,t−1²2j,t−1 − pj,t−1(Xj,t−1²j,t−1 + xi,j,t−1)
(17)
It becomes obvious from this expression that the actual rates of changes are
heterogenous.
A firm which did not produce variant j in period t − 1 but added this sub-
market in t first tries to estimate the change of output quantity of the incumbents
and determines its optimal quantity based on this. The expected rate of change
of output of the incumbents in the market is determined analogous to (17) where
xi,j,t−1 is replaced by the average output of a producer of variant j in period t−1.
Nj,t−1 should be the set of producers in the sub-market j in the period t− 1.
xi,j,t−1 =
∑
k∈Nj,t−1 xk,j,t−1
|Nj,t−1|
The expectations of firm i about total output in t in such a case is Xˆj,t =
λi,j,t ·Xj,t−1 + xi,j,t. Inserting into (16) implies a production quantity of:
xi,j,t =
Xj,t−1pj,t−1(²j,t−1 − 1)
[
²j,t−1(|Nj,t−1| − 1) +
√
²j,t−1(²j,t−1(|Nj,t−1|+ 1)2 + 4)
]
2
[
pj,t−1(²j,t−1|Nj,t−1|+ 1)− 2ci,j,tXj,t−1²2j,t−1(1 + µi,t)
]
(18)
Finally there is a minimum quantity xmin > 0 which has to be produced by
any firm which decided to keep this sub-market in its portfolio. If the result of
the quantity calculations is below this level the firm still produces xmin. Also in
the initial period and every time when a sub-market is founded the quantity xmin
is produced by the founder.
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2.6.3 Investments in Geographical Location
Starting from a random location the firms may decide to change their geographical
location from core (dgeoi,t = 0) to periphery (d
geo
i,t = 1) or vice versa. The shifting
of the location leads to the sunk cost cgeofix due to expenses for transferring the
production and R&D facilities. These costs are constant in order to keep the
model simple. The investments occur when a location is changed:
Igeoi,t =
{
cgeofix, if d
geo
i,j,t 6= dgeoi,j,t+1;
0, otherwise.
For the evaluation of the two location alternatives three factors seem to be
important. First, the production costs inside the core increase because of a scarce
resource. Second, the main advantage of a headquarter inside the core lies in the
learning effect through spatially transferred knowledge. But knowledge spillover
are a threat for the own core competence in knowledge. For this a third point
aims at the own technological leadership.
Because knowledge for product innovations is only a first step to form a tech-
nological advantage, the knowledge stock for process innovation RDproci,j,t (and the
corresponding spillover SP proci,j,t ) is the main indicator for a knowledge competence.
Thus for the evaluation of the location only this knowledge is considered.
The evaluation for the geographical location vgeoi,t of firm i lies in the interval
[0, 1], where a result of 1 stands for a strong incentive to set the headquarter of
the company inside the core. Mi,t is the set of sub-markets of firm i in period t.
A market j is in the set Ri,t if the potential knowledge spillover are greater than
zero: SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,t = 0) > 0. The evaluation function can be written as:
vgeoi,t =
 1
|Mi,t|
∑
j∈Mi,t
ci,j,t(d
geo
i,t = 1)
ci,j,t(d
geo
i,t = 0)

δi,R
δi,R+δi,RD+δi,SP
·
1− 1|Ri,t| ∑
j∈Ri,t
SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,j,t = 1)
SP proci,j,t (d
geo
i,j,t = 0)

δi,SP
δi,R+δi,RD+δi,SP
·
1− 1|Mi,t| ∑
j∈Mi,t
RDproci,j,t
RDprocj,t

δi,RD
δi,R+δi,RD+δi,SP
(19)
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As mentioned above the first term considers the marginal production costs
depending on the geographical location. If no other firm chooses their location
inside the core, the term would become 1. The first term decreases as the number
of firms inside the core increases.
The second term describes the effect of the knowledge spillover. The numer-
ator is the sum of the internal knowledge spillover which would occur in every
location. The denominator is the sum of the internal and external spillover. If a
firm profits a lot from the external spillover, the firm would have an incentive to
go inside the cluster.
The last term takes acknowledge of the possible loss of a technological core
competence. Hereby the firm’s i knowledge is divided by the maximum knowledge
of another firm in this market where RDprocj,t = maxi {RDproci,j,t }. If the potential
loss is great the firm would have the incentive to choose a location far away from
the other firms, or one minus this term promotes a location in the core.
Like in the evaluation function of market entry, see (13), the firm specific pa-
rameters δi,R, δi,RD and δi,SP represent the firm strategy. The parameters weight
the different terms such that heterogenous firm strategies can be reproduced. As
in the evaluation of markets there exists an inertia parameter κi,S.
If firm i has a location in the periphery (dgeoi,j,t = 1), the firm will choose their
geographical distance for the next period as following:
dgeoi,t+1 =
{
0, if vgeoi,t > κi,S ∧ Si,t > Igeoi,t (dgeoi,t+1 = 0);
1, otherwise.
If firm i is inside the core (dgeoi,t = 0), it will choose their geographical distance
for the next period as following:
dgeoi,t+1 =
{
1, if vgeoi,t < κi,S ∧ Si,t > Igeoi,t (dgeoi,t+1 = 1);
0, otherwise.
In both cases the shift of location has to be funded by the firm’s savings Si,t.
If the firm can not afford this, the firm’s location doesn’t change.
2.6.4 Investments in Research and Development
At the end of a period each firm decides on its investments in product and process
innovations. Both investments Iproci,j,t and I
prod
i,j,t increase the corresponding knowl-
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edge stocks RDproci,j,t respectively RD
prod
i,j,t . The R&D investment quota for product
innovation is denoted by qprodi and the quota for process innovation is q
proc
i .
Iprodi,j,t = q
prod
i · Πi,t∑
j
Iproci,j,t = q
proc
i · Πi,t
Since process investments lead to a reduction of per unit cost of production
the firm allocates these funds to the different sub-markets proportional to an
adjusted expression of its current output in each market.
Iproci,j,t = q
proc
i · Πi,t ·
xi,j,t∑
k∈Mi,t xi,k,t
A product innovation is seen as an alternative to market entry: in order to
extract rents on a profitable market a new market next to the existing one is
founded. For this the evaluation function for product innovations is is equal to
the evaluation of markets, see (13). The only difference is that now all markets
are considered, whereas the decision for market entry took only those markets
into account, which were not served by the firm i.
vprodi,j,t = vi,j,t =
(
Π¯i,j,t
maxk,l{Πk,l,t}
) δi,Π
δi,Π+δi,T ·
(
1
1 + dtechj,l,t
) δi,T
δiT+δi,Π
(20)
The firm i will invest all his expenditures for product innovations in the market
l with the highest evaluation (but only if vprodi,j,t > 0): I
prod
i,l,t = q
prod
i · Πi,t.
2.7 Market Clearing
With all given quantity outputs xi,j,t prices and price elasticities can be calculated
for all sub-markets. The price for each sub-market is given by expression (8) and
the price elasticity of demand can be calculated from the price function. With
the given cost functions every firm is able to derive their profit Πi,j,t on every
sub-market as well as their overall profit Πi,t:
Πi,j,t =
(
xi,j,t · pj,t − Fi − ci,j,t · x2i,j,t
)
(21)
Πi,t =
∑
j∈Mi,t
Πi,j,t (22)
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All firms start with initial Savings of S0. They can also take debts up to
the same level. Every period they earn total profit Πi,t but also have to make
their investments on process innovations Iproci,j,t and product innovation I
prod
i,j,t and
eventually on the change of location Igeoi,t . The Savings for the next period should
be expressed by the following formula while ρ stand for the interest rate:
Si,t+1 = (1 + ρ)Si,t +Πi,t − Igeoi,t − Iprodi,j,t −
∑
j∈Mi,t
Iproci,j,t (23)
3 Simulation Setup
The parameters of the simulation model can be found in Appendix A. They
were chosen in that way that the model was able to find reasonable and robust
results. For some of the parameters a certain range was defined. The results
presented in the next section are based on 100 randomly generated profiles which
were created while choosing the parameters from the given interval by a given
distribution function. With each of these profiles the model runs for T = 100
periods. The results of this runs were averaged in order to get the qualitative
impact of the parameters.
The model starts every time with a technology space with m0 = 5 technolo-
gies, located on a circle with the technological distances of dtech0 = 2 between those
technologies. In total the industry consists of n = 10 firms which interact on the
product markets. The geographical location of these firms is chosen randomly
such that in average half of the firms start in the core and the other half in the
periphery. Each firm starts with a randomly generated knowledge in one of the
technologies and is also an active member of the corresponding sub-market. The
starting level is normally distributed around mean RD0 with the variance σ20.
Thus on every sub-market there are exactly two firms active in the first period.
The firm are heterogeneous in their geographical location (dgeoi,t ), specific knowl-
edge (RDproci,j,t , RD
prod
i,j,t ), fixed cost (Fi), capabilities to perform R&D (αi, βi, q
prod
i ,
qproci ) and their firm strategies described by the evaluation function (κi,S, κi,ex, κi,en,
δi,T , δi,RD, δi,R, δi,SP , δi,Π).
Firms are able to rent money up to their starting level of savings S0. If
the savings of a firm are less than −S0 the firm is bankrupt. All knowledge of
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bankrupt firms is lost. Bankrupt firms are replaced in the industry with new
starting savings, same knowledge as the technological leader6 but only in one
randomly picked market and random geographical location. The new firm gets
new specific parameters which represent the new strategy. Therefore the total
number of firms is constant in the industry but the market structure of the sub-
markets is determined endogenous.
4 Results of the Simulation Studies
4.1 Observations as the industry evolves
In figure 5 an example for the circular technological space after T = 100 periods
is given, where the circle is closed in that way that the last technology (17) is
neighbor of the first technology (1).
Figure 5: An example of the circular technology space.
The numbers indicate the technologies in their creation order. Each peak
stands for a successful product innovation, the height represents the maximum
6The substitution of bankrupt firms is understood as an entry of a new firm in this industry
The firm would only enter if it has, at least in one technology, the same knowledge as a
technological leader.
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level of process innovation in that technology.
As written above the industry starts with m0 = 5 technologies with the tech-
nological distances of dtech0 = 2 between them. Thus the picture shows only one
radical product innovation, technology (8), which expanded the length of the
circular technological space from 10 to 12. Because of the assumed cumulative
structure of knowledge the highest peaks are in technologies with the numbers
around 20 but newer technologies would have more potential as the industry
would continue to evolve. The technological space may also be drawn for every
firm, in this case it would represent the technological profile of this firm.
In order to study the effects of geographical proximity the number of firms in
the core is presented with different cost for the scarce resource, see figure 6. All
three curves have a similar pattern.
Figure 6: Mean of firms in the core with different cost for scarce resource.
The initial location was chosen randomly and thus in average five firms start
in the core. Firms start with knowledge in only one technology. Because no
process innovations were introduced at the start, the additional cost in the core
compared to other cost are relative low. By assumption two firms have a knowl-
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edge stock greater than zero in each technology and hence no firm has a huge
technological lead. Because of the mentioned reasons firms have a strong incen-
tive to join the core at the beginning of the simulations. This incentive is reduced
in particular after the first introduction of new products around period 20. With
successful product innovations the innovating firms become technological leader
and try to keep their status by leaving the core. But afterwards firms again de-
cide to participate at the learning processes and enter the core. The relevance
of geographical proximity is reduced over the time but in average most of the
firms in all cases choose a location close to other firms. This means that a low
geographical distance to competitors is important during the developing period
of an industry as well as the industry becomes more mature.
In figure 6 three different scenarios were presented: no, normal and high
additional cost for scarce resources in the core. It can be seen, that even with
no extra cost not all firms join core. The possible loss of knowledge through
knowledge spillover could be one reason for voluntary isolation. In case of high
cost for the scarce resource these cost are around 50% of the average initial cost
with half of the firms in the core.7 This means that a location in core raises
the variable cost for every product quantity in that height. Because of process
innovations the relative value even increases. As illustrated in the picture even
with these high additional cost most firms choose a location with low geographical
distance to their competitors.
The next figure 7 could be interpreted as an industry life cycle (see Klepper,
1996). Here the median of active firms on one of the initial sub-markets (1)-(5) is
shown over the simulated time horizon for 100 simulation runs. The sub-markets
were chosen because they exist in all periods.
The simulation starts with two active firms on each sub-market. In the follow-
ing periods there is a high number of entrants in these markets. After a period
of stagnation firms leave the sub-markets although they collected a lot of specific
knowledge in the corresponding technology and although no explicit industry life
cycle was modelled in the demand function. One reason for this behavior could
be seen in the upper limit for the knowledge stock for process innovations which
7In average the initial cost are cinii,j = 0.5. With |Nt| = 5, cgeo = 1.2 and R = 0.05 the
geographical cost are cgeot = (5− 1)1.2 · 0.05 = 0.2639, see equation (12).
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Figure 7: Median of firms in the initial markets.
is low for the initial markets. As the industry evolves a smaller but constant
number of firms stay active on each market. Other firms may have knowledge
for this particular technology but they do not produce this product variant. A
similar behavior was observed after the founding of a new technology which also
created a new sub-market.
The presented pattern was observed much clearer in single markets, but the
picture shows that is also verifiably on a very high aggregated level.
4.2 Comparison of Different Scenarios
The following analysis is based on four scenarios which differ on the number of
firms in the core:
• 0% core: All firms are always in the periphery. No learning can happen
between the firms through knowledge spillover but firms can make use of
internal knowledge spillover.
• 50% core: Half of the firms are located in the periphery, the other half in
the core. Firms are not allowed to change their geographical location.
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• variable: This scenario represents the standard case with the decision rule
for changing the geographical location as described in chapter 2.6.3. Firms
start with a random location and are free to move as they can afford it.
In average about 60% of firms were in the core, therefore this scenario is
placed between 50% and 100% core.
• 100% core: All firms are always in the core. Firms profit from the ex-
ternalities arising from knowledge spillover but they also might loose their
technological lead pretty fast.
Figure 8: Boxplot of the total number of successful product innovations in dif-
ferent scenarios.
Figure 8 presents boxplots8 of the total number of product innovations in
each simulation run. The total number of product innovations rises sharply as
the number of firms in the core increases. Also the variance and the number of
upper outliers increased in the case of all firms are always located in the core.
8The boxplot function used for presentation was programmed by Ernest E. Rothman.
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A statistical test also underline this results (see Appendix B): with a confidence
level greater than 99% the null hypothesis, that the mean in scenario variable is
equal or greater than the mean in scenario 100% core, can be rejected. It could
also be observed that the number of radical product innovation raises with the
number of firms which participate at the learning processes, too.
Therefore it can be concluded that the existence of knowledge flows in the
core has positive effects on the number of product innovations developed in the
industry compared to a scenario where fewer firms are in the core.
Figure 9: Boxplot of the maximum knowledge stock for process innovation in
different scenarios.
The reached level of the knowledge stock for process innovation is presented
in figure 9. From this figure two observations can be made: First the variance
declines with the number of firms in the core. The upper border of 1 for the
knowledge stock could be one reason for the smaller variance. Second the level
of the knowledge stock for process innovation seem to reach its maximum in the
case with free choice for location. Statistically this proposition can be supported
with a confidence level of 90%, see Appendix B.
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Surprisingly in contrast to product innovation the maximum level of process
innovation in the cases 0% core is not that much lower than in 100% core. The
median increases slightly only from 0.9501 in the fist case to 0.9573 in the second
case, which is less than 1 percent change.
From this observation it can be deduced that that with fewer product in-
novations (see figure 8) and no learning between firms almost the same level
of process innovation was reached. Only in case of free choice of location the
knowledge stock for process innovations was significant higher.
Figure 10: Boxplot of the average level of savings in different scenarios.
The average savings in the case with variable number of firms is smaller than
in the case with all firms in the core, see figure 10. One reason for this is that
the firm’s sunk cost for changing the geographical location are chosen to be very
high (cgeofix =
S0
2
) and therefore reduce savings. It can be shown that with low or
no sunk cost firms have the highest level of savings in scenario variable.
In all cases where the firms are not allowed to switch location the savings are
about the same level. Thus the average profitability of firms does not depend
on the number of firms in the core: the savings in the cases of all firms in the
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periphery or all firms in the core are more or less equal. A similar result was
observed in the case where only half of the firms were in the core. Statistical
tests show that with a confidence level greater than 99% the difference of means
between the scenarios 0% and 100% core or 50% and 100% core is smaller than
10, see Appendix B.
On the one hand for the profitability of firms the results doesn’t change, but
on the other hand the technological development, measured in the number of
product innovations and maximum level of process innovation, does change with
the number of firms in the core. This result could be interpreted as a possible
justification for economic policy: as firms are indifferent about all located in the
core or all in the periphery, economic policy should try to enforce that all firms are
located in the core, because this would lead to a faster technological development
of the industry.
5 Conclusions
The paper introduces an agent-based simulation model which considers learn-
ing through heterogeneous knowledge spillover. Two factors were discussed in
detail: geographical and technological distance and their impact on innovation.
The model takes into account that firms differ in their specific knowledge and
firm strategy towards market entry and exit, R&D investments and geographical
location.
As a first result this model enables the description of the technological de-
velopment of an industry as well as the evolution of firm specific technological
profile. Geographical proximity is important for firms although they have to take
into account additional cost of scarce resources. The importance of geographical
proximity falls slightly as the industry evolves, but most of the firms still choose to
stay inside the core also in a more mature industry. The model generates typical
industry life-cycles with respect to the number of firms in each sub-market.
The comparison of different scenarios shows that the average savings of firms
are mainly reduced by location changing cost. As the profitability doesn’t change
in scenarios with all firms in the core or all in the periphery, the number of firms
does matter for the technological development of the industry. With an increasing
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number of firms, which exchange knowledge, the number of product innovations
raises sharply. In case of process innovations an increase of the mean and a
reduction of the variance could be observed. But the effect is much more clearer
with product innovations.
Further examination of the model will concentrate on the aspect of techno-
logical distance: What kind of clusters will emerge, technological specialized or
diversified? With regard to R&D strategy of firms the question arises, whether
it is better to concentrate on the core competence or do firms with more diver-
sified technological profile earn higher profits? How do the incentives for R&D
change through heterogenous knowledge spillover: can firms profit from their
R&D expenses or are they better off as free riders?
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Appendix
Appendix A: Parameter Setting
Parameter Value
b 0.5
c 0.93
d 0.94
e 0.95
T 100
m0 5
n 10
A 1
msize 100
τ 3
τex 3
cgeo 1.2
R 0.01
RD0 0.2
σ20 0.001
dtech0 2
S0 10
cgeofix 5
xmin 0.1
ρ 0
Table 1: Fixed Parameters
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Parameter Range
cminj 0.2 .. 0.4
cinij 0.4 .. 0.6
Fi 0.2 .. 0.4
αi 3 .. 4
βi 0.75 .. 0.85
qproci 0.08 .. 0.14
qprodi 0.4 - q
proc
i
κi,en 0.25 .. 0.75
κi,S 0.1 .. 0.5
δi,Π 0.3 .. 0.4
δi,SP 0.3 .. 0.4
δi,R 0.3 .. 0.4
δi,RD 0.3 .. 0.4
δi,T 0.3 .. 0.4
Table 2: Parameters with range (uniformly distributed in the range if not men-
tioned different).
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Appendix B: Statistical Tests
In order to present statistical analysis a two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test is
used where this test does not assume that the observations come from normal
distributions. The alternative hypothesis is formulated and the results of 100
simulation runs are tested.
1. Average number of Product Innovations:
H0: mean for scenario variable ≥ mean for scenario 100% core
H1: mean for scenario variable < mean for scenario 100% core
Results: Z = -9.716, p-value = 0
2. Maximum value of the knowledge stock for process innovation:
H0: mean for scenario variable ≤ mean for scenario 100% core
H1: mean for scenario variable > mean for scenario 100% core
Results: Z = 1.5711, p-value = 0.0581
3. Average Savings:
H0: |mean for scenario 0% core - mean for scenario 100% core| = 10
H1: |mean for scenario 0% core - mean for scenario 100% core| < 10
Results: Z = -2.4495, p-value = 0.0072
4. Average Savings:
H0: |mean for scenario 50% core - mean for scenario 100% core| = 10
H1: |mean for scenario 50% core - mean for scenario 100% core| < 10
Results: Z = -3.444, p-value = 0.0003
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